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“I see no greater strategic challenge for Europe than to 
understand the dramatic rise of China and to forge ties with it.” 
Peter Mandelson, EU Commissioner for External Trade, 2005 
1. Introduction 
Internationalisation of Chinese companies, unthinkable even a decade ago, has hit the 
headlines of leading newspapers. The names such as Lenovo, Haier, and CNPC became 
recognisable brands, and the world is witnessing the shift from “Made in China” to 
“Made by China”. China’s rapid economic rise and its global ambitions have given 
ground to call the 21st century as the Chinese Century. The Chinese economy has 
become a scholarly pursuit, with numerous publications and studies on this topic. 
While China itself is a lucrative growing market, the competitive forces drive domestic 
companies to pursue an active policy of expansion abroad and to seek to strengthen their 
market position on a global stage (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Boisot, 2004). The 
prospect that China is becoming a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
being received with a mixture of enthusiasm and anxiety by many recipient countries. 
While the inflow of long-term equity investment is wholeheartedly received by many 
economies, some, especially developed countries raise concerns about the motivations 
and quality of the Chinese capital.  
In particular, the potential infringements of intellectual property rights, loss of control 
over natural resources in the event of global scarcity; questionable management 
techniques and governance practices; and the unsavoury human rights reputation of the 
Chinese government and, by extension, of its stable of state-owned enterprises. While 
some of these mentioned concerns are not without merit, it would be unwise for 
recipient countries, including Europe, to reject Chinese investment on basis of 
generalisations about the motivations and practices of the Chinese government. 
Since China will very likely continue to be the major exporter of capital for the 
foreseeable future, its important role for the European economies cannot be ignored but 
rather must be evaluated in the context of the Chinese institutional environment that has 
shaped its internationalisation strategy. It is with this in-depth knowledge that European 
policy makers and business practitioners alike can be prepared to strike a balance 
between the promises and perils of Chinese outward investors and eventually to reap the 
benefits of competing against the largest world-wide economy. It is for these reasons 
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that this explorative paper seeks to provide an overview of the patterns and motives of 
Chinese outward investments and the government policies that have facilitated the 
Chinese internationalisation process, with an explicit focus on Europe, i.e. 
Europeanisation of Chinese firms. In this attempt, we address some white spots in the 
literature regarding this research area.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the internationalisation 
motives and drivers of Chinese firms. Section 3 provides a detailed overview of China’s 
state policy on the outward direct investment. It is followed by Section 4 which focuses 
on Europe as a destination for Chinese investment; particularly, it illustrates increasing 
involvement of Chinese companies into the European business and economic arena. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Rise of the Dragon 
Today, China has become the world’s fifth largest outward direct foreign investor with a 
total of 75 billion US dollars in outward stock by the end of 2006 (MOFCOM, 2007). 
Noteworthy, the country has increased its annual FDI outflow significantly over the last 
two decades: the average annual outward FDI flows grew from 450 million US dollars 
in the 1980s to 2.3 billion US dollars in the 1990s (UNCTAD, 2004: 57). Only a short 
time period in the recent years already records a large increase in the value of outward 
FDI stocks, as Figure 1 illustrates.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 China’s outward FDI stock in the 2003- 2006 
Source: authors’ calculation based MOFCOM (2007)      
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The distribution of Chinese outward FDI to different regions is depicted in Figure 2, 
highlighting a sharp increase in the FDI outward flow towards Asia and Latin America, 
while Africa, North America and Europe have experienced an incremental increase in 
Chinese FDI flow. The following sections will provide an overview of the main drivers 
and motives of Chinese internationalisation activity that have led to the impressive 
surge in Chinese outward FDI activity and analyses the rationale for Chinese 
internationalisation in the context of traditional and recent internationalisation theory.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 China’s outward FDI flow by regions, period of 2003-2006    
Source: authors’ calculation based MOFCOM (2007) 
 
2.1. Theoretical Rationale and Drivers for Chinese outward FDI  
The last two decades have experienced a surge in the emergence of multinational 
companies from developing economies (Heenan and Keegan, 1979; Kumar and 
McLeod, 1981; Kumar, 1982; Lall, 1983; Wells, 1983), resulting in significant 
academic interest later in the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, corresponding to the 
increasing importance of these companies in the global economy (Sauvant, 2005; 
OECD, 2006; UNCTAD, 2006; Goldstein, 2007; Benito and Narula, 2007; BCG, 2008). 
Especially, the phenomenon of Chinese internationalization has increasingly drawn the 
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attention of scholars (Ye, 1992; Tseng, 1994; Wu and Chen, 2001; Wong and Chan, 
2003; Child and Rodrigues, 2005).  Traditionally, the rationale for Chinese 
internationalisation has been searched within the classical OLI paradigm developed by 
Dunning (1977, 1988), where the wish to exploit existing ownership advantages, asset 
exploitation, is regarded as one of the three key drivers for internationalisation. In the 
case of China, asset exploitation would involve costs advantages due to the low wages 
and production improvements achieved in recent years. This competitive advantage is 
asserted to allow the company to secure sufficient returns in order to cover the risks and 
costs that overseas operation entail (Buckley and Ghauri, 1999; Caves, 1971)1. While 
the cost advantage of Chinese companies is a relatively important competitive factor for 
simple and lower income markets, it is not sufficient to compete in higher value-adding 
markets. Hence, the initial competitive advantage of low labour costs becomes less 
crucial as the firm moves into more sophisticated international markets. In order to 
explain why Chinese companies still pursue the international expansion in more 
sophistication markets, one has to deviate from the classical theoretical framework. 
Instead, recent theoretical developments in the field of emerging country multinationals 
emphasise the relative disadvantage of companies from emerging economies which 
drives them to internationalise. Hence, contrary to the notion of competitive advantage, 
companies will move abroad to avoid a number of competitive disadvantages incurred 
by operating exclusively in the domestic market. In the case of China, a number of 
disadvantageous domestic conditions can push Chinese firms to internationalise. For 
example, Child and Rodrigues (2005: 388) list the following ones: 
- regional protectionism limiting opportunities available otherwise in a large 
domestic market to exploit economies of scale; 
- restricted access to capital preventing investment in plants of optimal scale;  
- underdeveloped intellectual property rights (IPR) regime limiting access to 
sophisticated technologies;  
- lack of skilled human resources; 
- weak local infrastructure entailing rising transportation costs. 
                                               
1
 Further key drivers of internationalisation include the location specific advantages, such as the 
attractiveness of overseas location over domestic market, as well as the internationalisation advantage of 
companies, where the investment and production overseas is more profitable than exporting goods 
produced domestically. 
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Hence, the concept of relative disadvantage regards international investment as a means 
of addressing competitive disadvantages in the home markets.  This paper adopts the 
view that additionally to the initial ownership advantage of Chinese firms, the presence 
of domestic pressures and constrains explains the ongoing internationalisation process 
of Chinese companies. Consequently, we present both the “pull” and “push” factors that 
drive Chinese internationalisation as well as the main facilitating factor, the Chinese 
government that has supported the Chinese overseas experience.  
Table 1 Rationale of Chinese outward investment 
Drivers (pull and push)  Facilitators 
- Dangers of operating in an increasingly 
competitive and complex domestic market, 
and decreasing profit margins. 
- Potential to complement cost advantages of 
domestic production with differentiation 
advantages overseas. 
- Necessity to access and secure advanced 
technology and expertise. 
- Acquisition of internationally recognised 
brands. 
- Access to entrepreneurial and managerial 
skills and know-how. 
- Strong governmental 
support for 
internationalisation: 
o financial incentives 
o non-financial support 
o institutional support 
o information provision 
o access to state-
supported scientific 
and technological 
research 
 
Source: based on Child and Rodrigues, 2005 
 
2.3. Pattern and Motives of Chinese outward investment 
The internationalisation of Chinese companies has evolved through a number of stages 
with different levels of engagement (Child and Rodrigues, 2006; Warner et al, 2004; 
Tseng, 1994; Cai, 1999). After China had adopted its open door policy in 1970s, the 
first generation of Chinese multinationals, large state-owned enterprises operating in 
monopolised industries emerged. These state-owned Chinese companies were important 
players in natural resources, driven to secure control of such resources abroad 
(UNCTAD 2006). Well-known examples include as CITIC Group, a diversified 
financial and industrial conglomerate founded in 1979, COSCO, China State 
Construction Engineering Corporation and Sinochem. For these first-generation Chinese 
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multinationals, Hong Kong most often presented the first and last overseas stop along 
their path of internationalisation.  
After the early 1990s, the second generation of major Chinese companies emerged in 
competitive manufacturing industries, related to electronics, information and 
communication. Here, major players as Haier and TCL dominate the markets for 
consumer electronics, while Huawei Technologies is competing against multinationals 
originating from industrialized economies in the global telecom equipment market. 
Contrary to the first generation of State-owned Chinese multinationals, the second 
generation is characterised by “diverse ownership structures, including private 
ownership, local government ownership and foreign participation” (UNCTAD 
2006:130). Accordingly, the Chinese internationalisation path has evolved from the 
basic levels of exporting to subcontracting production for outsourced foreign 
companies. Eventually, Chinese companies have reached the more advanced level of 
internationalisation, involving the physical and organisational expansion of Chinese 
firms into overseas locations funded by outward FDI and entailing the commitment to 
manage and organise operations located outside mainland China. 
The motives of Chinese overseas expansion can be categorised according to the 
traditional classification of resource-, efficiency-, market- and asset-seeking FDI 
(Dunning, 1993). Especially towards developing countries, China is driven by both 
resource and efficiency seeking factors, e.g. China has investments in the oil industry in 
14 countries, including Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, the Sudan and Yemen 
(UNCTAD, 2004: 57). Further, to support exports, Chinese firms establish local 
distribution networks (especially in industries with excess production capacity such as 
machinery and electronic appliances) and relocate mature industries to lower wage sites 
(e.g. bicycle production in Ghana). Increasingly, Chinese companies are targeting 
advanced developed economies such as Germany, Japan, Sweden and the United States 
to build international brands, access advanced technologies and to establish R&D 
centres. Concluding, we follow Child and Rodgrigues (2005: 397) observation that 
today’s leading Chinese companies internationalise with a “more focussed and longer-
term strategic view and appear to be developing the capacity to organise overseas 
operations systematically” Consequently we assert that Chinese companies increasingly 
internationalise with a view to becoming a global player in international markets.  
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3. China’s “Go Global” Strategy 
3.1. Government policy for private investment 
In the recent decades, financial liberalisation and economic openness have led to 
changes in the corporate governance, and a larger role of multinational companies in the 
global economy. FDI, the main vehicle of their operation, has gained importance. 
Nowadays, practically all countries in the world vie and compete for FDI. In some 
countries attraction of FDI has even topped policy agenda, as the governments seek to 
attract technology and create jobs and production capacities. Hymer (1960/1976) 
introduced a concept of “liability of foreigness” meaning that entrant firms face 
disadvantage vis-à-vis domestic firms due to foreign exchange risks and unfamiliarity 
with the business conditions of the foreign market. It serves as justification for investment 
incentives provided to foreign companies entering a host economy (Morisset and Pirnia, 
2002). Moreover, the global business does not possess all necessary information about 
all potential locations on the globe; therefore, active promotion by the government is 
necessary. Overall, investment promotion has become a widely researched topic (e.g. 
Loewendahl, 2001; Enderwick, 2005; Zanatta et al, 2006). 
Foreign investment is a two-way street, the government can support outward investment 
by its domestic firms too. Broadly speaking, a government can play a role in the process 
of internationalisation of domestic firms through two channels. Firstly, it can foster 
technological development within the national economy, which would strengthen the 
home basis of companies, or secondly, it may stimulate companies with subsidies or tax 
rebates for moving overseas, so that the companies can leverage key assets otherwise 
not available in the home environment (UNCTAD, 2006). A state can also conduct 
“economic diplomacy” to promote the interests of their companies overseas. As this 
policy would lead to some sort of capital flight, it is unsurprising that only few countries 
conduct it. 
Currently, it seems that the Chinese government has been focusing on the second 
channel. It has been encouraging firms to invest abroad by relaxing approval procedures 
and offering them financial support and corporate income tax incentives. However, it 
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was a long road that China had to travel on its way to becoming one of the main 
outward investors among developing countries. 
 
3.2. History of China’s policy for outward investment 
The Chinese government has been active in preparing its top companies to go overseas 
and expand. The first roots of China’s current policy for outward investment may be 
found back in 1979 when the government started encouraging outward FDI as part of 
the broader “open door policy”. In fact, before 1979, outward investment was very 
limited, and mostly concentrated in trade-supporting activities, e.g. sales subsidiaries 
(Zhan, 1995). This policy had several goals, mainly securing supply of raw materials 
and strengthening economic ties with its neighbours (Zhan, 1995). 
Screening of every outward investment project was executed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). The first MOFTEC-approved 
subsidiaries were established in 1979. By the end of 1983, 76 non-trading subsidiaries 
operating in 23 countries had been established, with the total investment valued at $900 
million (Wall, 1997). Only specific state-owned enterprises under strict state guidance 
were allowed to invest abroad; and every outward FDI project had to be screened (and 
approved) by this authority. In 1985, MOFTEC issued a directive which somewhat 
relaxed this extremely strenuous and centralised approach. Another directive was issued 
in 1989. Both directive established clear “rules of the game” and procedures. 
The directives also defined objectives for outward FDI: access to advanced technology 
and channelling it back home, access to raw materials, increased earning of foreign 
exchange and expansion of exports of goods and services, i.e. strengthening economic 
ties with its neighbours. As for the policy instruments, a wide array of measures were 
employed, such as tax incentives, subsidies and privileged access to the domestic 
market for the goods manufactured by overseas subsidiaries of Chinese companies 
(Wall, 1997). 
From the early 1990s, the Chinese government switched from merely allowing to 
actively encouraging outward direct investment. October 1993 was an important 
landmark as the policy of outward investment was endorsed by the 14th National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. While there was a clear trend of gradual 
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liberalisation of outward FDI regime in the 1980s and early 1990s, some obstacles 
emerged. First of all, the government feared of losing the control over the companies 
going abroad and secondly, many overseas subsidiaries of Chinese companies 
performed quite poorly. The government tightened its grip over the internationalising 
companies and strengthened post-approval procedures. 
Overall, the experience of the 1980s and 1990s tells us that the Chinese government has 
been always trying to find a balance between the perils and promises of 
internationalisation of the Chinese companies. On one side, internationalisation would 
enable access to raw materials, markets, equipment and know-how. Yet, it could 
jeopardise the state control over the companies, lead to poor financial performance due 
to weak management in subsidiaries and their inefficient monitoring, and ultimately 
cause excessive capital outflow. 
In June 2000, Shi Guangsheng, China’s minister for foreign trade and economic 
cooperation speaking at the “21st Century Forum” stated that the government would 
encourage national companies to go global turning into multinational companies. It was 
a radical shift as the policy has extended from active targeting of FDI inflows to 
promotion of FDI outflows too (Asian Economic News, 2000). 
Formally, China’s current strategy “Go Global” was initiated in 2002. The timing is 
unsurprising: in 2001 China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and support of 
the overseas expansion of Chinese companies became a priority for the government. 
The strategy aims to encourage its enterprises to invest overseas. The plan is to create 
between 30 and 50 national champions (to be in the Fortune 500 list, Annex 1) from the 
most promising state-owned enterprises by 2010, which are labelled as “state-owned but 
not government run”. 
The policy was further enhanced and bureaucratic process simplified. In October 2004, 
MOFCOM, the successor of MOFTEC, announced that the right to examine and 
approve applications relating to outward investments would be transferred to the local 
departments of commerce. The number of documents necessary for the application was 
considerably reduced. And in 2005, China’s Ministry of Commerce introduced a 
reporting mechanism, requiring companies to report overseas mergers and acquisition 
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intentions. On 1 July 2006, foreign exchange purchase constraint for outbound 
investment was abandoned thus making overseas investment even easier. 
 
3.3. Motives, instruments and agents of China’s outward investment policy 
Scholars have identified several key reasons for outward investment policy (e.g. 
Fischer, 2002). They can explain why the policy was initiated in the specific 
circumstances of Chinese economy. 
Firstly, there is the macroeconomic situation and foreign trade. China has accumulated 
huge amounts of foreign reserves that are putting the upward pressure in the foreign 
exchange rate of Chinese renminbi. In the case of floating exchange rate that would be 
solved in a free market way – appreciation of the Chinese currency. But since the 
exchange rate is fixed, the government seeks the ease the pressure in the national 
economy by investing and acquiring assets overseas. As for foreign trade, China has 
faced many anti-dumping complaints and hence outward investment rather than import 
has become a viable solution. 
Secondly, it is a business motive. Many Chinese companies grew big on the national 
market, and yet they haven’t been exposed to the tough international competition. Not 
many companies can grow organically anymore as the pace of change is increasing. 
Therefore, the government seeks to equip the domestic firms and their management 
with international experience in order to be able to win in the competition (Nolan, 
2001). It is worth emphasizing that the competition is played out not only on the global 
markets but also in China itself. As more and more multinationals enter China, domestic 
firms that once enjoyed dominance, now find themselves under increasing pressure 
from (more advanced) foreigners. This situation is completely different from the East 
Asian tigers – Hong Kong (China), South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of 
China whose companies established dominance in their home markets before going 
abroad. Overall, by going global Chinese domestic companies would gain access to 
technology, know-how and skills, and to build their structure and operations in line with 
the international standards. It is expected that access to these factors will underpin 
further economic growth at home. 
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The third motive is the politics or state diplomacy. China seeks to build its political 
capital and influence around the world. By supporting national companies, it seeks to 
use its “soft power” in contrast to U.S. military might – “hard power”. For example, 
while the U.S. asserts global control over natural resources (fossil fuels in particular) 
through its military presence worldwide, China aims to reach economic and political 
agreements with suppliers of natural resources – “reserve building” strategy. The 
miraculous growth of China’s outward investment and the significant role played by the 
Chinese government in this process indicate that political motivations are at least as 
important as the economic reasons (Cai, 1999). On the state level, China forms alliances 
with other developing countries in political forums and multilateral negotiations; it 
enhances access of Chinese companies to these markets. Moreover, Chinese companies 
may enter markets which are “no go” area for their Western counterparts, e.g. Sudan, 
Myanmar and Iran. Likewise, Russian multinational companies invest in Cuba, Libya 
and Syria. 
Last but not least, there is an issue of prestige. China seeks to project its image as a new 
leader in the 21st century. Similarly to the organisation of the Olympics Games, 
Chinese government considers it as a matter of national pride to see Chinese firms in the 
top list of global companies, such as Fortune 500 and Forbes 2000. 
Overall, the state policy of support to firm internationalisation reflects the Confucian 
paternalistic approach of the Chinese leadership. It is the government that initiated the 
reforms in 1979 and hence it is the task of the government to prepare domestic firms for 
competition with Western companies in the global economy. 
The Chinese government has designed a set of policy instruments to be used within this 
policy area. They include, inter alia, information-sharing networks on overseas market 
development, access to foreign currency (low-interest funding from state-owned banks), 
direct and direct subsidies, and domestic tax breaks. For example, a state owned Export-
Import Bank of China offers special loans to domestic firms for international expansion. 
The China Development Bank is also active in this area. In 2005 it issued a low-cost 10 
billion US dollars loan to Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd for company’s international 
expansion. 
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Another policy instrument is a database on foreign countries’ investment environments 
that has been set up by MOFTEC, and it helps companies facilitate the investment 
decision-making process. The database includes information about the legislation of the 
country in question (investment law, taxation policies), investment opportunities, etc. 
Aside from MOFTEC, another state agency is involved in the management of Chinese 
multinationals, it is the Chinese-government entity, the State-Owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC). It is nurturing “national champions” 
companies and encourages them to go global. SASAC controls 155 Chinese companies, 
which have combined 2006 revenues of 1.06 trillion US dollars and combined 2006 
assets of 1.56 trillion US dollars. It was established in 2003 to take over state-owned 
enterprises whose ownership was distributed among different ministries. SASAC 
reports directly to the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (BCG, 2008). 
 
4. China and Europe: New Battlefields 
4.1. Global expansion of Chinese companies 
What are the implications of the rise of Chinese companies (and China’s government 
policy) for the European companies? Undoubtedly, it entails tougher and increasingly 
multifaceted competition between Chinese and European companies. More importantly, 
the battlefields of competition have shifted from the local Chinese market and 
neighbouring Asia Pacific region to developing countries of Africa and Latin America. 
Not to say, that Europe itself will be the arena of fierce competition. 
The following analysis will provide more in depth insight into the Chinese 
internationalisation strategy. 
Firstly, the companies compete on the global markets by the means of foreign trade. For 
example, Huawei Technologies is competing with Germany’s Siemens and Finland’s 
Nokia on the global market of telecom equipment; and Haier is a competitor of 
Sweden’s Electrolux on the global market of white goods. 
Secondly, European companies are starting facing competition from Chinese companies 
in the markets of developing economies, where the West has traditionally held the 
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dominance. As it has been noted above, Chinese companies are very active primarily on 
the markets of developing countries. 
Thirdly, a worrisome development for the European companies is that Chinese firms 
enter Europe and compete with them on their home ground. Although Europe is not the 
main destination of the Chinese investment, the trend is taking shape.  
 
4.2. Europeanisation of Chinese companies 
Broadly speaking, Europeanisation refers to a process whereby a subject adopts a 
number of European features (Olsen, 2002). More often than not the term is used in the 
social sciences in relation to European political integration and evolving cultural 
identity of European citizens (Hansen and Wilson, 2000; Borzel and Risse, 2003). 
In the context of our research, in relation to Chinese companies, we operationalise this 
broad concept as sustained efforts to enter competitive European markets, to strengthen 
their presence in Europe with the goal of getting access to superior technologies, know-
how and competence. 
Europeanisation is more than simple initiatives of separate business entities, but rather a 
well-developed strategy orchestrated by the Chinese government. While indeed the 
Chinese companies wish to strengthen the presence by expanding the production and 
capturing new markets, nevertherless the main goal is seen in strategic positioning and 
using Europe as a springboard for global operations. In order to do so, they use 
European-specific skills, methodologies, technologies and knowledge and align with the 
European code of conduct to sustain competitive pressure. 
In an attempt to pursue Europeanisation, many Chinese companies opt for entering 
Europe by acquiring assets or establishing greenfield projects in Western European 
countries. Examples are many. Nanjing Automotive acquired U.K. car manufacturer 
Rover. In 2006, China Telecom established its European subsidiary in London. In July 
2005, the Nanjing Automobile Group purchased the remaining assets of British MG 
Rover Group; and motorbike manufacturer Qianjiang Motor acquired the operations of 
Italian Benelli Company. In 2004 Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tool Group 
acquired Schiess, a 140-year-old producer of heavy-duty lathes and boring machines, 
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based in Aschersleben (Eastern part of Germany). The company was at the verge of 
bankruptcy and some parts of the production process were already being transferred to 
China. After acquisition, the core business of Schiess – production of heavy-duty 
machines will stay in Europe. As for Shenyang, acquisition will enable it to gain access 
to Schiess’ unique expertise (Business Week, 2005). 
The strategy of acquiring finally-troublesome engineering companies and relocating 
production process to lower-cost locations is evident in the case of TCL too. This 
Chinese manufacturer of electronics and electric appliances started his “European 
invasion” from the acquisition of acquisition of Germany’s Schneider Electronics AG in 
October 2002. Yet, the company didn’t manage to retain all its operations in Germany 
and manufacturing part was relocated to Hungary later. November 2003, it acquired 
France-based Thompson Electronics’ television operations. In July 2004, TCL and 
Thomson Electronics formed TCL Thompson Electronics (TTE), the world’s largest 
television manufacturer with assets of more than 500 million US dollars and an annual 
capacity of 20 million colour television sets. In August 2004 it acquired 55 percent of 
Alcatel’s mobile handset operations for 55 million US dollars, though the joint venture 
was later dissolved. 
As the examples illustrate, the perceived advantages of Western Europe for Chinese 
companies are access to technology, know how and expertise. Yet, the cost of 
manufacturing in Western Europe is extremely high, especially for Chinese companies. 
Moreover, the barriers to market entry are too high; the only viable solution seems to be 
acquisition of a domestic company. Even then, a newly acquired company has to sustain 
a competitive advantage. Not to mention, the quality standards that have to be 
maintained, especially for the European consumers who place a high premium on the 
quality of products. Finally, the strong labour regulations (and trade unions) in Europe 
will add to the overall challenge. 
Yet, it is the Western European consumer that holds the strongest purchasing power on 
the Continent. Hence, the Chinese companies face a tough challenge – the market is to 
be found in the West, but the chances for Chinese companies to enter and survive in 
highly competitive Western European market are quite low. 
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With the latest EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, Chinese companies found a new 
strategic opportunity. They enter Single European market through former communist 
states of Central and Eastern Europe, now the new EU member states and the 
commercial gateway to Europe’s half-a-billion market. This strategy allows Chinese 
investors to jump over EU tariff barriers2 and to reap the benefits of the Single market, 
yet at a significantly lower cost comparing to the West European countries. In other 
words, this is the second type of Europeanisation pursued by the Chinese companies.  
As Figure 3 highlights, while the stocks of Chinese outward investment in the West 
(“old EU member states”) have tripled over the period of 2003-2006, the stocks in the 
East (“new EU member states”) over the same period have increased by the factor of 
six! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Stocks of outward FDI of BRICS economies (mln USD) 
 
Note: New EU member states (EU12) are depicted in yellow bars; old EU member states (EU15) are 
depicted in blue bars. Source: MOFCOM (2007) 
 
 
                                               
2
 Tariff jumping can be perhaps the only possible strategy taking into account numerous trade wars 
between China and the European Union. In many instances, the EU has accused China of dumping, and 
introduced progressive duties on a variety of goods. For example, throughout the 1990s, EU accused 
China of exporting TV sets at unjustifiably low prices; it introduced duties of 40% on most TV sets 
produced in China. These duties were lifted only in 2002, but even then EU imposed quotas on the 
amount of imports and introduced minimum required prices. Needless to say, that the duty is not 
applicable if more than 50% of a product is made within the EU borders (by a Chinese subsidiary). 
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4.2. New EU member states: a backdoor to Europe 
EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 has been a subject of wide debates and thorough 
research. In relation to international business, an issue of delocalisation is quite often 
raised. In search of the efficiency and cost-saving motives, multinational companies 
relocate their manufacturing activities from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. At the 
same time, as the living standards in the East improve and the wages increase, this 
competitive advantage is being eroded. Manufacturing is shifted further to the East (to 
the other side of EU border) or to South East Asia, China in particular. According to the 
European Restructuring Monitor (ERM, 2008), over 85% of all delocalised jobs from 
the EU15 over the period of 2002-2008 have been relocated to either new EU member 
states or Asia, with broadly equal proportions going to each region. This process has 
been known for long, and in fact it has largely overshadowed investment flows in the 
opposite direction, when the Chinese investors choose Eastern Europe as a point of 
entry to the Single European market. 
Whilst Taiwanese companies have been active in Eastern Europe since the opening of 
these economies in 1989, mainland Chinese companies have been reluctant and 
hesitating and they began investing in Eastern Europe only in the recent years. 
Accession of Eastern European economies to the European Union has undoubtedly 
contributed to this process. 
As Figure 4 shows, four main investment destinations for Chinese companies are 
identified in Eastern Europe. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are the largest 
economies among the new EU member states that joined the bloc in 2004. The rise of 
the Chinese outward FDI stock in these countries is striking in 2005, with a one-year lag 
after 2004. Moreover, Romania that acceded to the Union in 2007 started recording FDI 
inflows from beginning of the 2000s. In the following analysis we look on Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Poland. 
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Figure 4 Stocks of outward FDI in selected new EU member states (mln USD) 
Source:  MOFCOM (2007) 
 
Hungary is being increasingly viewed as a manufacturing hub for Chinese companies 
targeting the Single European market. Currently, some 3000 Chinese-founded 
companies are operating in Hungary, and the value of their investment is 200 million 
US dollars (excluding the Bank of China investment) (Hungary in China, 2008). 
Hungary is a base for the following Chinese manufacturing multinationals: Changshu 
Standard Parts Factory (Hungarian Aogai Fastener Co., Ltd, fasteners manufacturing), 
Hisense Hungary Kft. (electronics manufacturing – LCD, PDP, CRT TV), Lenovo 
Technologies Hungary (PC manufacturing), Skyworth Multimedia Hungary Kft. 
(entertainment electronics and IT products), TCL Overseas Holding Electronics Ltd. 
(LCD manufacturing), Shinco Electronics (DVD manufacturing), XOCECO – Prima 
Hungary Kft. (electric household appliances), ZTE Hungary (telecommunications 
equipment and network solutions). 
The case of Hisense Company Ltd of Qingdao, Shandong Province is illustrative. In 
August 2003, management of the Chinese television maker visited Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, looking for a site for company’s manufacturing activities. All 
three countries offered relatively similar conditions. Finally, the company opted for a 
Hungarian town of Sarvar. The municipality was keen to find a new investor to 
counterbalance withdrawal of another multinational – Microsoft Corporation, which 
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moved its production of X-Box game consoles to China. The decision was made in 
2004. Perhaps, a key factor for the investment was the presence of an industrial park 
operated by Flextronics, a Singaporean OEM. Hisense had already had partnership with 
Flextronics as it produces Hisense phones at its Chinese plant in Shenzhen (and 
Flextronics had already produced TV sets for the Chinese TV maker TCL in Hungary). 
Now Hisense has production bases in South Africa, Hungary, France, Pakistan, Algeria 
and Iran. The TV sets produced in Sarvar are earmarked for the EU market 
(International Market News, 2004; Washington Post, 2004). 
As for the Czech Republic, its performance in terms of China’s inward investment is 
impressive too. Changhong Electronics is one of the biggest TV makers in China, with 
an annual turnover over 2 billion US dollars and stable overseas sales with a share of 
over 30% in the total revenue. In 2005 it announced its decision to invest totally 100 
million US dollars to set up a TV production base in the Czech town of Nymburk, east 
of Prague.  Within the first stage, Changhong planned to build five flat-panel TV 
production lines. The parent company established a wholly-owned subsidiary 
(Changhong Europe Electric s.r.o.) with a registered capital of 9.5 million US dollars. 
As planned the subsidiary will focus not only on manufacturing, but on marketing 
consumer electronics and more importantly, on R&D. The annual output is to exceed 
one million units sold across Europe, thus making the Czech production base the largest 
overseas plant of Changhong. Investment in the Czech subsidiary symbolises an 
important starting point of the corporate internationalisation strategy, promotion of the 
Changhong brand and creating a firm foundation for its products in the single European 
market (Xinhua, 2005; Changhong, 2006). 
Recently, another Chinese company chose Czech Republic as a launching pad in its 
international expansion strategy. In May 2008 State-owned Shanghai Maling Food Co 
Ltd opened its first 25 million US dollars European plant in a Czech village of 
Hrobcice. It plans to bring its Chinese-style fare – luncheon meat, canned pork, ham and 
ready-to-eat meals – to Europe. The problem the company faced was high product 
standards in EU and import restrictions on agricultural goods, hence seriously 
hampering imports from China. The company considered several locations in Europe, 
but investment incentives (a five-year-long tax break) offered by the Czech government 
and lower labour and construction costs convinced the Chinese investor. The new 
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canning factory is in fact company’s second manufacturing investment in the Czech 
Republic (Business News, 2008; Deutsche Welle, 2008). 
Poland recorded the largest stock of Chinese inward investment among new EU 
member states. The latest example is quite illustrative. In 2008, Chinese computer 
manufacturing giant Lenovo, a new owner of IBM production unit announced its 
decision to build a factory and an order processing centre in Poland’s Legnica Special 
Economic Zone. Poland’s subsidiary is the first European desktop computers factory 
whose annual production is expected to reach 1.7 million computers. Lenovo will invest 
4.1 billion euro and will employ around 1300 people both production workers and 
highly-qualified specialists. Lenovo and Volkswagen are two flagship investment 
projects in Legnica special economic zone (PAIiIZ, 2008). 
To sum up, while Chinese investors eye Western Europe as a repository of technology 
and know-how and hence the dominant business strategy is mainly acquisition of 
existing (engineering) companies, Eastern Europe represents a slightly different case. It 
is a destination for efficiency-seeking foreign direct investment, with the purposing of 
establishing manufacturing base and exporting to the West duty free within the 
boundaries of the Single European market. 
The European regulations require that more than half of the value of parts and labour 
used in the production must come from within Europe. The rest may come from China, 
so that Chinese companies may capitalise on their low-cost base. Manufacturing costs 
even in the new EU member states are much higher than in China and yet, the fact that 
goods produced within the EU borders may be sold duty-free across the Single market 
justifies manufacturing inside the EU over import of these goods from a home base in 
China. This strategy – moving a key part of supply chains closer to customers – enables 
to decrease transportation costs and avoid tariffs. 
Dunning (1993) developed a widely acknowledged classification of four main motives 
for investment: resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and strategic asset 
seeking FDI. In our analysis (Table 2) we aim to relate the investment strategies of 
Chinese companies entering Europe with this theoretical framework. We look 
separately at Western and Eastern Europe.  
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Table 2 Motives of Chinese companies’ Europeanisation 
Dunning’s FDI types 1st type of Europeanisation 
(Western Europe) 
2nd type of Europeanisation 
(Eastern Europe) 
Resource-seeking (seeking 
access to natural resources) 
Europe does not appear on the Chinese investment map 
as a destination for resource-seeking investment. 
Market-seeking 
(“horizontal FDI”, seeking 
new markets) 
Western European market 
with its affluent consumer 
is a magnet for Chinese 
market-seeking FDI. 
Eastern European growing 
market may be lucrative 
for Chinese companies, 
especially in the lower-
priced goods sector. 
Efficiency-seeking 
(“vertical FDI”, seeking to 
restructure existing 
production through 
rationalisation and placing 
some parts of the value 
chain overseas) 
Strictly speaking, for 
efficiency-seeking FDI, 
Western Europe is 
unattractive due to the high 
costs of manufacturing. 
Manufacturing (assembly) 
of parts of the product as a 
way of tariff jumping. 
Asset-seeking (seeking 
strategically created assets) 
Acquisition of companies 
with strong expertise and 
utilisation of this expertise 
in the production process 
in the acquired company or 
elsewhere in the corporate 
network. 
Asset-seeking FDI from 
China in Eastern Europe is 
a limited phenomenon. 
Source: authors’ elaborations 
 
Despite seemingly clear-cut division of FDI types, it should be noted that FDI (either 
greenfield or acquisition) is most often driven by a combination of motives rather than 
by a single one only. For example, a Chinese company aspiring to build a competitive 
presence in Europe has the possibility to acquire a manufacturing firm in Western 
Europe with the purpose to access superior European technologies and know-how 
(asset-seeking) while relocating the manufacturing process to Eastern Europe 
(efficiency-seeking) and still serving the common European market (market-seeking). 
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4.3. European response to Europeanisation of Chinese companies 
The EU as a whole and each member state is concerned about the right balance between 
investment promotion and restriction on the political grounds. The question is whether 
Europe wants Chinese investment and hence exposing itself to potentially politically-
driven decisions of Chinese multinationals. The key perils and promises of the Chinese 
outward direct investment are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Perils and promises of Chinese investments in Europe 
Perils Promises 
Chinese companies under the strong 
political influence of the Chinese 
government; Europe potentially exposes 
itself to the political leverage from 
Beijing.  
As a rule, Chinese investors acquire 
businesses in financial hardship, those 
who would go bankrupt and lead to job 
cuts and decrease of the tax base (e.g. 
Schiess AG, Schneider Electronics AG, 
Welz Industrieprodukte). Chinese may 
revitalise them. 
By acquiring assets in Europe, Chinese 
companies may get access to latest 
technologies and know-how. In the 
situation, when most Chinese companies 
are not familiar with the European IPR 
regime, European companies stand to 
loose their core technologies to the 
Chinese competitors. 
Favourable investment treatment of 
Chinese companies in Europe would 
enhance opportunities of European 
companies in the Chinese market 
(reciprocal investment treatment) 
Source: authors’ elaborations 
 
Chinese companies receive support from the Chinese government, and yet as any other 
investor they may also apply for investment incentives in a host country. Virtually all 
EU member states offer these fiscal and financial incentives in different forms and 
shapes. Moreover, most EU nations provide information on potential investment 
projects. In some countries Chinese companies are explicitly targeted, attracted, and 
invited to invest. For example, Germany’s Cologne region launched “China Initiative” 
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in a bid to attract additional investment from China. A similar initiated has been 
launched in Düsseldorf (“Düsseldorf China Center”). As a result, Chinese companies 
may benefit from two sides. As for their European counterparts, they may rely only on 
investment incentives of the host country (e.g. China).  
 
Table 4 Chinese and European companies and government support to direct investment 
Support from European company Chinese company 
Home country As a rule, no support for outward 
investment 
China’s “Go Global” policy 
(financial and non-financial 
support) 
Host country Information provision 
Investment incentives granted by 
Chinese government 
Information provision 
Investment incentives (within the 
“state aid” regulations) 
Source: authors’ elaborations 
 
Europe becomes a battlefield of not European and Chinese companies as such, but that 
of public policies. Chinese government is pursuing the policy of “state capitalism” and 
“picking the winners” industrial policy, reminiscent of old industrial policies of the 
industrialisation period of the second half of the 20th century, especially in Latin 
America. 
Yet, on the European continent, negative connotation is attached to the seemingly 
outdated policies of “picking winners” and support to “national champions”. The title of 
one the recent publications of the European Commission perfectly expresses a departure 
from this approach: “A policy for industrial champions: From picking winners to 
fostering excellence and the growth of firms” (EC, 2006). Instead, the focus of public 
policy has been on the promotion of entrepreneurship and support to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME) by the horizontal policy measures. Moreover, direct support of 
national government would create an advantage for a company over its competitions. 
Therefore, in order to ensure fair competition across the Union, Article 87 of the EC 
Treaty generally prohibits state aid. Yet, state aid is allowed in some exceptional cases, 
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such general measures open to all enterprises, such as R&D grants. Overall, the 
European policy-making has been developing in the direction of innovation policy, 
encompassing science and technology policy (Borrás, 2003; Lundvall and Borrás, 
2005). 
Logically, the question is whether European SME will be in a good shape to withstand 
the competitive pressure from huge Chinese conglomerates that are fully supported by 
the Chinese government. Can Europe’s horizontal innovation policy compete against 
China’s paternalistic industrial policy? 
While Europe is still at the crossroads, the U.S. government has found a solution. While 
it preaches the liberal economy and free trade, in the U.S. major cross border M&A 
deals are reviewed and cleared by the Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS) for 
“national security reasons”. As a result, the Chinese petrochemical company CNOOC 
withdrew its bid for Unocal in 2005. Europe is less restrictive in this respect. Should 
Europe follow the U.S. example and become more restrictive? 
 
5. Conclusions 
China’s outward investment activity has undergone a considerable change lately, in 
terms not only of the magnitude but also the geographical focus and sectoral 
composition of flows. The paper has shown that Chinese companies consider 
internationalisation as a strong attempt to adjust and succeed in the global capitalist 
market. Yet, internationalisation of Chinese companies is not purely a business process 
but rather a part of well-coordinated strategy orchestrated by the Chinese government. 
Creation of “national champions” is a key motivation for the Chinese government to 
encourage outward investments, within the framework of its economic transformation.  
Internationalisation of Chinese companies can be considered as a policy instrument 
applied in the pursuit of China’s integration in the global economy and leveraging its 
political interests. 
Europe is emerging as a promising destination for Chinese outward investments. Europe 
should develop a comprehensive strategy towards outward investments from China. 
Whilst the Chinese strategy is unique per se, this example of state-led 
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internationalisation of domestic firms has already drawn interest from the part of other 
emerging economies, particularly Russia. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a 
speech in January 2008 (while still in the capacity of Deputy Prime Minister) to 
influential Russian big businesses. He appealed to Russian companies to “copy China” 
by expanding overseas and going on a global buying spree of foreign assets. "This is a 
very important task. The majority of powerful countries are engaged in this. Many of 
them are very active, like China. And we should be active, too” (Financial Times, 
2008). Mr. Medvedev emphasised that expanding Russian presence overseas would be 
beneficial for the Russian economy and it would cut Russia’s dependence on foreign 
technology. A global expansion drive would “allow us to retool Russian enterprises 
with technology, boost their production culture and grant them the opportunity to 
diversify investments and win new markets” (FT, 2008). 
In this paper we have developed the concept of Europeanisation of Chinese companies. 
There are still white spots where further research is needed. Despite the fact that the 
topic of China in general has been extensively researched, however, the issue of 
outward investment by Chinese companies deserves particular attention. We have 
identified two main research avenues which need to be further developed. 
Firstly, research on subsidiaries. Aggregated data on the amount of outward of foreign 
direct investment is a very rough proxy for activities of multinationals. There is a need 
to “zoom in” to activities of Chinese multinationals in Europe. Hence, a logical step 
further is a study of subsidiaries of Chinese companies. Recent research on foreign 
subsidiaries (starting from the seminal paper of Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998) has 
equipped scholars with the tools for such analysis. More specifically, the following 
questions arise: what kind of functions these subsidiaries possess, what level of 
competence they have, what is the level of their autonomy, what is the path of their 
development and learning over time. Ultimately, the question is raised how the host 
country policy can shape technological development of subsidiaries and their evolution 
(Costa and Filippov, 2008; Filippov, 2008). 
Secondly, foreign direct investment (acquisitions or greenfield) represents a classic way 
of internationalisation. At the same time, dynamism and turbulence of global business 
environment have forced companies to adopt different strategy to internationalisation. 
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One of them is by forming a strategic non-equity alliance with foreign partners. 
Strategic alliances are becoming a widely used tool of cooperation between European 
and Chinese companies (Duysters et al, 2007). 
The research on the topic is not a pure academic exercise, but rather it highlights the 
political and business implication of the current trend of China’s internationalisation 
activities for Europe. The penetration of Chinese conglomerates into the European 
continent is politically and financially supported by the state, giving them the 
competitive edge over more market-oriented Western companies, as the former may not 
be subject to the same fiscal discipline vis-à-vis their capital providers. While the arrival 
of Chinese companies may pose a threat to the domestic European companies, the role 
of Chinese outward investment for the European economy cannot be ignored. It is with 
this knowledge and understanding of the Chinese internationalizations strategy, that 
European policy makers are equipped to formulate careful responses to the arising 
challenges and to successfully reap the benefits of the Chinese presence.  
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Annex 1 
 
BRIC companies in the Fortune 500 list 
 
2007 2006 2005  
Number  Revenues 
($ bn) 
Number  Revenues 
($ bn) 
Number Revenues 
($ bn) 
Brazil 5 168.6 4 115.4 3 67.7 
Russia 4 176.0 5 157.7 3 86.5 
India 6 147.5 6 120.4 5 86.8 
China 24 838.5 20 617.4 16 464.5 
Mexico 5 172.6 5 146.8 2 78.2 
USA 162 7 338.4 170 6 816.9 176 6 221.8 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Fortune 500 list 
Note: Fortune 500 includes Hong Kong-based companies in the list of Chinese firms 
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